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A large and increasing proportion of agricultural growth in Africa must come from continuous gains in
land productivity in areas of high population density and hence with already relatively high yields. What
that requires is analogous to the green revolution in Asia. Several features differentiate the African situa-
tion. Those include greater diversity in cropping pattern including a historically larger and more wide-
spread tropical commodity export sector. The physical infrastructure in rural Africa is far inferior to
that of most Asian countries. While the greater diversity of agriculture calls for a larger and more diverse
institutional structure the reality is that the research systems, the ancillary education systems to spread
innovation and the rural ﬁnancial systems are generally greatly inferior to those of Asia at the beginning
of the green revolution. Ethiopia’s record of a steady six to seven percent growth for agriculture and nearly
halving of rural poverty demonstrates that with the right policies and investments a very poor country
starting with poor physical and institutional infrastructure can bring a major contribution from agricul-
ture growth to increased GDP and reduced poverty. As in Asia, the bulk of accelerated agricultural growth
will come from small commercial farmers. They have sufﬁcient farm income to reach or exceed the pov-
erty level. Those are farms with, depending on the country, as little as 0.75 hectares to a few tens of hect-
ares of land. They comprise up to half the rural population and produce on the order of 70–80 percent of
agricultural output. They are in general not poor. The poor have inadequate land to reach the poverty level,
initially withmuch underemployment, and with substantial non-farm employment. The primary driver of
poverty reduction is the small commercial farmer spending on the order of half of increased income on
nontradable, employment intensive goods and services from the rural non-farm sector.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.Background
The other papers in this issue document that in rural Africa, a
large area, number of families, and volume of production are char-
acterized by high population densities with increased inequality of
income and assets. In such areas, growth in production and income
can occur only modestly from enhanced area and must increas-
ingly be dominated by expanded value of output per hectare. That
suggests an African green revolution as the appropriate approach
and from that an appeal to Asian models.
The African Union has sponsored an intensive exercise to
provide an appropriate model. That model, CAADP, has been signed
off on by the heads of state of all the African countries (African
Union, 2010). It prescribes a rapid six percent agricultural growth
rate, a minimum ten percent of government expenditure onagriculture, and agricultural growth recommendations explicitly
modelled on the green revolution in Asia. It should be kept in mind
that green revolution technology, although biologically based, sub-
stantially increases labor productivity. In India the elasticity of
employment with respect to output was typically about 0.3 (Rao,
1975).
However, for Africa, the national level success stories in achiev-
ing such growth are few. This text draws attention to three coun-
tries sometimes cited as success stories, but with differing levels
and means of achieving accelerated agricultural growth. Each
made the CAADP strategy central to its approach with national
adaptation. Rwanda and Ethiopia set a higher than CAADP growth
target of eight percent, while Ghana set six percent (Ghana,
Government of, 2010; Rwanda, Government of, 2007; Ethiopia,
Government of, 2010, 2009). Each was explicit that this was a
‘‘Green Revolution’’ strategy. Each accepted in principle the CAADP
target for a ten percent share of government expenditure to agri-
culture. Rwanda started with seven percent and then raised that
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the ten percent target by 50 percent. Ethiopia and Rwanda have
been explicit in setting a high fertilizer growth target (Ethiopia,
Government of, 2010, 2009; Rwanda, Republic of, 2007, 2012).
Ethiopia started earlier than the other two, pre-dating CAADP,
was explicit that agriculture is central to its overall strategy.1 Gha-
na’s success has been largely restricted to the smallholder coffee
areas. It is too early to judge the success of Rwanda. The Ethiopian
success of 15 years of six to seven percent growth rate for cereals
production is now well documented (Stuff, 2013).
Given the low level of achievement of the CAADP targets gener-
ally, this paper states how the African situation may differ from
Asia, calling for modiﬁcation of the strategy, but not a departure
from the core of high output high input agriculture driven by bio-
logical science based technological change. The paper then pro-
vides the theoretical basis for the increasing rural income
inequalities in high population density areas and the consequent
dominance of the not poor small commercial farmer in agricultural
growth. It then brieﬂy explains how that growth is converted
through the rural non-farm population into the rural poverty
reduction that accompanies accelerated agricultural growth. Final-
ly the paper draws on Asian and African experience to brieﬂy sum-
marize the critical public goods essential to high agricultural
growth rates in high population density rural areas.Intensiﬁcation – green revolution – Africa is different
The green revolution had massive impact on agricultural
growth rates in much of Asia, changed the public attitude towards
agricultural growth, and with a few years lag greatly reduced pov-
erty (Mellor and Desai, 1985). Six characteristics stand out as dif-
ferentiating Africa from Asia and make it more expensive and
perhaps time consuming for Africa to achieve the Asian results.2Greater diversity
In general, Asian countries were dominated, in production and
population concentration, by irrigated rice and wheat. When Rob-
ert Chandler became the ﬁrst Director-General of the International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) he stated a single objective – to dou-
ble rice yields in Asia. With such a straight forward objective IRRI
very quickly created the varieties that would do that. They spread
rapidly, and were followed by a series of varieties adapted to an
ever widening but still modest range of conditions. Doubling rice
yields had massive national and regional impact. When CIMMYT
in Mexico, the sister institution of IRRI, dedicated to maize and
wheat production, nearly concurrently had the break-through in
wheat, another very large area was covered.
Africa does not have a similar homogeneity of production con-
ditions. The paper by Headey and Jayne (2014) in this volume
notes that cereals have a much smaller share of total agricultural
output in Africa than in Asia. It follows that for Africa to have as
big an impact on food production there must be a much larger
expenditure on research, and extension as well, to add up to a total
comparable to Asia.
Of course, just as in Asia, research breakthroughs for particular
commodities will cause greater specialization and decreased diver-1 Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles set a vision of middle income status by 2025 and
a strategy of Agriculture Development Led Industrialization (ADLI). For a set of case
studies on such a strategy see Mellor (1992). The agricultural development strategy
was backed by an intensive analysis and quantiﬁcation of the policy and investment
requirements (PIF). The PIF was widely reviewed within both the Ethiopian
government and the donor community before it was accepted by the government.
The members of the drafting committee were Demese Chanyalew, Chairman,
Berhanu, and John W. Mellor.sity as farmers shift to the more proﬁtable varieties and crops. Asia
used to be much more diversiﬁed than it is now. For example in In-
dia the wheat crop was typically inter-planted with an oilseed crop
(Mellor et al., 1968). Similarly, pulses soon largely disappeared
from the irrigated areas, and imports of pulses from Africa in-
creased. In the vast areas suitable to irrigated wheat the research
breakthroughs radically increased its proﬁtability relative to inter-
cropped oil seed and to pulses.
Some deplore this loss of diversity and it does have a cost, but it
was a major part of the green revolution results.2 With high pro-
ductivity research systems, crop speciﬁc breakthroughs and diverse
production conditions African countries will certainly specialize
more than now. Nevertheless, ex-anti it is difﬁcult to judge where
to concentrate the research money and consequently the research
expense will be higher than for Asia.
A common criticism of the CGIAR international research system
in Asia is that it focused inadequately on soils and problems of fer-
tilizer response relative to plant breeding. That criticism is far more
apt in Africa (e.g. Tittonell and Giller, 2012), with its highly variable
soils, very low organic matter, and some argument of low response
to inorganic fertilizer, perhaps due to low organic matter.Perennial export crops important
This of course should be a large plus factor for Africa. Perennial
export crops are high value per hectare and per worker. Having a
large base and potential to expand should be a major driving force
in accelerated income and production growth. That has not been
the case. For one, donors who control so much of the investment
in African agriculture have emphasized food crops. In addition,
perennial crops require more ﬁxed investment than annual food
crops and the ﬁnancing institutions are lacking. More on that, be-
low. It is argued that both inelastic demand and wide ﬂuctuations
in prices justify neglect of the tropical export crops. However, as be-
low, Malaysia has done very well in palm oil, Kenya in tea and Gha-
na in cocoa. Coffee should suffer somewhat less on the price front,
since the bulk of African coffee production is from high elevations
with excellent quality for which demand has been growing rapidly.
Malaysia is dominated by two agro-ecological types – the poor
upland soils and the rich river basins that also characterize coastal
West Africa. Malaysia saw a huge potential in smallholder oil palm.
It brought an improved variety from INEAC (located in the erst-
while Belgium Congo), the most advanced oil palm research station
in Africa and the world, modelled its budding oil palm research
system on INEAC, trained an oil palm extension system, and subsi-
dized planting in smallholdings thereby assisting the relatively
poor rural Malay people.3 Ignoring foreign aid negativism about
inelastic demand, Malaysia soon became the number one producer
of oil palm, which it still dominates. Shifting of the demand function
with rapid growth in low and middle income countries has been far
more important than its inelastic shape. Oil palm is now inconse-
quential in West and Central Africa. Nigeria’s share of global oil
palm exports dropped from 23 percent in 1961–63 to 0.6 percent
in 1971–73 (Lele, 1991).
In the rich river basin soils Malaysia quickly took up the high
yielding rice varieties that could pay for increased irrigation (BellFor a broader discussion of the bio-diversity aspects of a green revolution see
Mellor (2002).
3 The Chairman of the Malaysian Palm Oil Organization states that forty percent of
the area is held by smallholders (Bainow, 2013). I emphasize this because of the much
greater impact of growth in the smallholder sector on poverty reduction through the
income and employment multiplier effect as documented in a later section as
compared to large scale estates and because of the large effort by the Malaysian
government to support smallholder production. This argues for support of the
smallholder sector in Africa. The problem is not that the ex-colonial powers did not
foster large scale plantations – it is the lack of support for smallholder production.
68 J.W. Mellor / Food Policy 48 (2014) 66–75et al., 1982). Thus Malaysia recognized its diverse physical re-
sources and concentrated on two crops each suitable to a speciﬁc
agro-ecological niche. Malaysia gave no attention to annual food
crops on the relatively poor upland soils.
The American foreign aid program (USAID) uses the rather pecu-
liar phrase ‘‘feed the future’’ as the over view of its development
assistance to agriculture. That places the emphasis on basic food sta-
ples, a position emulated by many other donors. Lele (1991) and
Mellor (1989) document this broad tendency.4 Since adoption of for-
eign agricultural institutional structures has been central to catch-up
growth in all low income countries the inﬂuence of foreign aid has
been substantial. Most notably the emphasis on research both na-
tional and international has been on the food crops. Little emphasis
is on reducing the cost of production of the tropical export commod-
ities. This did not deter Malaysia from investing its own funds in oil
Palm research– similar to Ethiopia putting its funds into foreigndonor
ignored teff (Minton et al., 2013) –with excellent results in both cases.
The donor community has backed annual horticulture export
production and it has grown rapidly in a few countries. But its total
is small compared to the perennial export commodities. There are
other exceptions to the foreign under-emphasis on export com-
modities. The Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) brought
immense prosperity to large areas (and booming market towns)
with effective foreign assistance (Lele, 1975).
Even in coffee the African institutional structures are much less
well developed than in Latin America. For example, Ethiopia still
has no oversight body for the sector, while Guatemala, in Anacafe,
has a powerful body with major sources of revenue to ﬁnance a
high level of research, coordinated extension, and quality control.
Most Latin American countries have institutions similar to Anacafe,
while the African analogues are mostly lobbying organizations
with limited direct development effort.
Ghana is stated as a success story in agricultural growth. As
noted, it has a clear plan for accelerating growth. However, the suc-
cessful part of the strategy is cocoa production, forwhich the growth
has been rapid, largely through expansion in the forest area, and led
by attention from the cocoa research institute. The rapid growth in
cocoa has been accompanied by rapid reduction in rural poverty,
conﬁned largely to the cocoa producing areas that experienced the
rapid growth (Breisinger et al., 2011; Ghana Government of, 2007).6 The more productive areas initially have more poor per square mile but a lowerLess irrigation (but better rain fed)
As stated, widespread irrigation of rice and wheat, provided
much more homogenous conditions for the spread of the IRRI
and CIMMYT varieties in Asia. Africa is characterized by modest
levels of irrigation, even in countries with large potentials. As in
the previous section this barrier to the green revolution is more
an example of missed opportunity than a permanent barrier.
Grasping the opportunity does call for considerable catch up
investment and institutional development.5 However there are
three offsetting forces to the paucity of irrigated land.4 The Lele citations on foreign aid, here and later in this paper, take a more nuanced
approach to foreign aid than this paper. As Lele points out there has been signiﬁcant
foreign aid to agriculture in African countries. Sometimes that input was restrained by
recipient country pressures (often preferring aid to urban industry and central
infrastructure). However in Asian countries, at an earlier period, foreign aid to
agriculture (with the exception Taiwan) fought an uphill battle against the heavy
industry approach. My less nuanced approach comes from simple comparison of the
results in Asia and Africa. The striking success of foreign assistance in building Asian
institutions for agricultural growth has not been matched on that scale in Africa.
5 You et al. (2011) provide detailed estimates of irrigation potential – currently six
percent of area with 17 percent as the potential – thereby to account for about one-
third of total production. Realizing this potential will certainly not match the huge
river basins and deltas of Asia but it is nevertheless enough for substantial aggregate
impact. See also Xie et al. (2013).First Africa has large areas with assured rainfall. In Ethiopia, the
high potential, assured rainfall areas account for 70 percent of agri-
cultural output (Table 1). With major research breakthroughs in
those areas that percent would climb rapidly to more than 80 per-
cent. Much of East, South, and coastal West Africa’s agricultural
production is in areas of reliable rainfall. It is of course the volume
of production in the assured rainfall areas not the area that counts
towards production potential. The assured rainfall areas have
much higher yields initially than the less reliable areas and of
course respond more to research breakthroughs. In Asia the foreign
aid and research concentrated on the high potential areas. In Africa,
there has been pressure in the name of income distribution and
poverty reduction to concentrate more on the low potential areas
(Lele, 1991; Mellor et al., 1987).6
Second, there is a large unrealized potential for irrigation (You
et al., 2011; Xie et al., 2013). In Ethiopia, assured rainfall areas have
sufﬁcient rainfall to provide scope for small scale schemes to irrigate
most of those areas. The Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) for
the current 10 year plan allocatedwell over half of all investment to
irrigation (Ethiopia, 2010). Irrigating the assured rainfall areas dou-
bles the cropped area by allowing cropping in the dry season (ini-
tially Ethiopia is a one crop a year country) and of course
occasional droughts do occur in the assured rainfall areas and that
would be mitigated by irrigation. In West Africa the large river sys-
tems provide a large underdeveloped potential for irrigation. Sub-
stantial irrigation development has occurred in Mali, Senegal, and
Nigeria, but certainly not at the level to provide the proportion
developed comparable to Asian countries (You et al., 2011).
In West Africa, the excellent soil river basins in the high rainfall
coastal areas should have year around cropping. The drier area to
the north should have large irrigated areas. One reason that irriga-
tion potentials have not been developed is the apparent high costs
of irrigation development, especially compared to Asia and per-
haps a view of unlimited land area for expansion (You et al.,
2011). The paucity of research and low expenditure on critical pub-
lic goods also reduces returns to irrigation.
Third, the large areas suitable to perennial export crops are not
lagging for lack of irrigation. Most of them have adequate rainfall.Poorer physical infrastructure
African countries are characterized by high input prices, notably
fertilizer, and low output prices because of transport systems
vastly inferior to those of Asia (Rashid et al., 2013). Thus, the cost
of providing Asian infrastructure conditions starting now is very
high. Once again Ethiopia is demonstrating what massive invest-
ment in rural infrastructure can do (Dercon et al., 2008; Minton
et al., 2012).7 IFPRI studies show that in the past ten years the cost
of diesel fuel in Ethiopia has gone up by 60 percent (reﬂection of
worldwide trends) while the average cost of transportation hasproportion of poor than the low productivity areas – see the later discussion of the
production functions in the respective areas.
7 The references to Ethiopia are copious. That is because it is unique in having from
the Prime Minister a clear vision (reaching middle income status by 2025), an explicit
strategy for reaching that goal in which agricultural is central – Agricultural
Development Led Industrialization (ADLI), exceeding the CAADP target for govern-
ment investment in agriculture by 50 percent, massive investments in rural
infrastructure, since 1995, and consistent growth in agriculture of on the order of
seven percent per year (Ethiopia, 2010; Stuff, 2013). The long standing IFPRI EDRI
collaboration in Ethiopia provides an unusual wealth of data. Ethiopia had unusually
low income even by African standards at the start. Rwanda and Ghana share much of
this and are reported liberally in this paper, but they were later starters with
consequently less to show in the short run. Finally Table 1 for Ethiopia is compared to
the table elsewhere in this issue that shows that Ethiopia on the issue of population
density is not an outlier compared to other African countries. The primary difference
in Ethiopia is the temperate climate.
Table 1
Ethiopia: total area CULTIVATED by farm size and agro-ecology. Source: Calculations from the Agriculture Sample Survey of 2007/08, Central Statistical Agency (CSA).
Farm size (hectares) Moisture reliable cereal Moisture reliable enset Humid lowland Drought prone Pastoralist Total
(percentage of national total)
0.0–0.25 0.9% 1.1% 0.1% 0.6% 0.1% 2.7%
0.25–0.52 2.9% 2.4% 0.1% 2.2% 0.2% 7.9%
0.52–0.90 7.1% 2.9% 0.3% 3.8% 0.3% 14.4%
0.90–1.52 14.0% 2.7% 0.4% 6.7% 0.6% 24.3%
1.52–25.20 33.5% 2.2% 0.8% 13.1% 1.1% 50.7%
Total 58.6% 11.2% 1.6% 26.4% 2.3% 100.0%
aEach farm size interval (quintile) contains 20 percent of Ethiopia’s small farms, approximately 2.57 million farms.
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cause of a massive trunk and rural road building campaign with very
large public expenditure (and an ancillary high rate of inﬂation!).
Rural electriﬁcation is rare indeed in Africa. The high agricul-
tural growth areas of India, e.g. the Punjab, have universal village
electriﬁcation. In the mid 1970s USAID made major pushes for in-
creased rural electriﬁcation in the Philippines and Indonesia. More
to the point, when the high yielding varieties struck in India there
was little rural electriﬁcation, but political pressures brought it
quickly in much of the green revolution irrigated area. Ethiopia
has been pursuing rural electriﬁcation.
When Resources for the Future in collaboration with the Na-
tional Electric Cooperative Association of the US put out a book
of case studies they ﬁrst elucidated how valuable electriﬁcation
is to growth in agriculture. Then out of eight case studies, none
are for an African country (Barnes, 2007). There were none to
mention.Poorer institutional structures
When the high yielding varieties hit Asia they were preceded by
a long history of development of agricultural institutions and an
immediately prior period of foreign aid assistance on a large scale
to the key institutions of research, extension, and ﬁnance. Concur-
rently large foreign assistance went to higher agricultural educa-
tion to train the large numbers of personnel to staff those
institutions and a rapidly growing private sector as well. Thus,
the institutional structure for quickly modifying and adapting ap-
plied research, extending knowledge to farmers, and ﬁnancing in-
puts was well-established. The new high yielding varieties walked
into a very hospitable institutional environment (Mellor et al.,
1968).
In Africa, therewas a similar, early period of foreign assistance to
institutional development in a few countries e.g. Michigan state in
Nigeria, Oklahoma in Ethiopia developing excellent agricultural uni-
versities and through them research and extension (Eicher, 1984).
But by the time independence had been generalized and a green rev-
olution could be thought of foreign aid was already turning away
from agriculture, away from the non-poor small commercial farmer
who accounts for the bulk of agricultural growth (see below), and
most importantly away from national scale development of institu-
tions by governments and towards small scale unintegrated private
sector and NGO efforts with little national impact (Mellor, 1989;
Mellor et al., 1987; Lele, 1991). The abandonment of assistance to
higher agricultural educationwasmost striking andmost damaging
(Eicher, 1984). As a result the institutional structures, particularly
the central public sector component is still way short even now of
the Asian standard when the green revolution struck.
Finance systems for the small commercial farmer are another a
dramatic case. When the green revolution struck, essentially all
Asian countries had specialized national systems for extending
credit, and often also mobilizing deposits, to the small commercial
farmers. Those systems moved large sums of money to thosefarmers. Typically one-quarter of all working capital was ﬁnanced
from these systems (Desai and Mellor, 1993).
Because of rapid growth and consequent loose management
systems and to some extent political interference these Asian sys-
tems, unlike their counterparts in developed countries several dec-
ades earlier, had high rates of overdue loans. These overdues
commonly ran to 45 percent. This turned the donor community
against these institutions, stating that they were non-viable be-
cause of the overdues (Desai and Mellor, 1993). The result was that
the late developers, including a few laggard Asian countries such as
Nepal, and essentially all African countries lacked these systems
for ﬁnancing the high cash costs of agricultural intensiﬁcation. This
turning away from ﬁnancial institutions for the small commercial
farmer was reinforced by the concern that the loans were largely
to non-poor farmers.
Along came the Grameen Bank and micro credit to reach the
poor and rapid growth of such institutions in Africa. They have been
successful, investing large sums in the poor, more urban than rural
however, and achieving high repayment rates. They were not suit-
able to the small commercial farmer however and those producers
of output growth were left out (Desai and Mellor, 1993). Most Afri-
can countries are still left with little coverage for the small commer-
cial farmer. The most striking difference between ﬁnance systems
for the poor and those for the small commercial farmer is how
repayment is achieved. For the poor, group guarantees in the con-
text of member savings drive the lending program. For the much
larger sums per loan, lesser social cohesion, less connection be-
tween a group’s savings and loans, repayment for the small com-
mercial farmer must rely more on agricultural technology
competent loan ofﬁcers who ensure proﬁtable loans and regular
follow-up to ensure repayment on time (Desai and Mellor, 1993).
Political instability and corruption
In the early days of independence many African governments
were stable for substantial periods of time. Many of those stable
governments had the same leadership attitudes as for Nehru India
and Sukarno Indonesia – favoring urban large scale industry over
agriculture and strongly socialist views even for agriculture, and
not understanding the nature of scale in agriculture (Lele, 1975;
Mellor et al., 1987) In Asia however foreign aid pushed hard for
emphasis on agriculture, substantially successfully so and recog-
nized the key role of public goods to small holder agricultural
growth Mellor et al., 1968). In Africa foreign aid was often support-
ive of the more loony ideas, as in the Ujama movement pressed by
President Nyrere in Tanzania, while it had worked strongly against
such schemes (large scale socialized farms) from Nehru in India
(Lele, 1975, 1991).
Many governments became less stable after the initial cases of
post-independence longevity – e.g. Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire, and Zim-
babwe. Corruption erupted. Between the two it is difﬁcult to have a
consistent steady growth strategy and to provide the essential
public goods for rapid agricultural growth. That in turn has
strengthened the private sector orientation of foreign aid. Kenya
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was doing well in agricultural growth, largely based on the small
commercial farmer (Lele, 1975; Mellor et al., 1987; Johnston and
Kilby, 1975). With deterioration in government the key public-sec-
tor institutions declined in capacity. That has also happened in In-
dia with a major impact in slowing the agricultural growth rate
and hence the poverty reduction rate (Desai et al., 2011; Tamboli
and Nene, 2011).
Implications of Africa’s distinctive characteristics
The salient implications for future policy and investment of the
green revolution related differences between Asia and Africa are
ﬁve. First, agricultural research and extension and by derivation
higher education training of personnel must be vastly larger and
more expensive with somewhat lower rates of return. They are
now grossly underﬁnanced relative to the diverse needs. Second,
the perennial tropical export commodities, including oil palm, co-
coa, coffee and tea, must realize their large aggregate potential for
growth, in the geographic areas in which they have comparative
advantage, with provision of large additional funding and special-
ized institutional structures for coordination of the interrelated re-
search, extension, ﬁnancing and quality enhancement that
characterize the big success stories in these commodities. Third,
government leadership must ensure ﬁlling the ﬁnancing void with
national, specialized agricultural ﬁnance systems that lend large
sums based on the proﬁt and loss statement not the balance sheet
to the small commercial farmer. Mobilizing deposits should be an
integral part of that effort. Fifth, massive additional investment in
rural roads, electriﬁcation, and irrigation is required. The bulk of
the ﬁnancial requirement is for the rural infrastructure. Much of
that is also essential to results from the social expenditure for what
will for several decades be a growing rural population.
The emphasis here is on public goods, as is the case for CAADP.
The private sector is of course dominant in all the successful agri-
cultural growth cases, but its growth depends on agricultural pro-
duction growing and the public goods are a necessary, and now
under emphasized element. All these elements cannot be done at
once at the required scale. Setting priorities and leaving some less
attended may well give the targeted growth for a few years, by
which time the laggard areas can be brought up to give a ﬁnal
set of pushes to the growth rate. For example, Ethiopia has ne-
glected agricultural ﬁnance and the coffee sector – but both are
now receiving special attention and may thus play a role in sus-
taining the high growth rate.8 Of course, there are exceptions. Disease such as malaria (in the terai of India and
Nepal, and many parts of Africa) and those associated with Tsetse ﬂy, or massive loss
of life from wars may stop the population growth that results in areas of productive
land becoming high population density areas. When those forces are removed it will
be a matter of a few generations before they become high population density areas.
9 An early article (Mellor and Stevens, 1956) provides a rigorous presentation of
this point, with Asian examples in mind. The distinction is more important in the
African context. See also Binswanger and McIntyre (1987).
10 Masters et al. (2013) show the large difference in size of farm between the lower
and upper quartiles and the inadequacy of the farm size in the lower quartile to
provide even a poverty level of income. See also Jayne et al. (2010) and Headey and
Jayne (2014), this issue.
11 Both Timmer and Ravallion and Datt draw attention to the poverty reduction
impact of agricultural growth reduced by highly unequal distribution of land and
income. However they are referring not to the differences between the small
commercial farmer and the landless and near landless, but between large scale, often
absentee land owners who are not part of the consumption patterns of the rural
community e.g. the haciendas of Latin America.Land and income distribution in high population density areas
To understand the requirements for agricultural growth and
poverty reduction in high population density areas it is necessary
to ﬁrst understand the land and income distribution that typiﬁes
such areas and how they differ from low population density areas.
We know that agricultural growth is associated with rapid decline
in poverty (Ahluwalia, 1978; Timmer, 1997; Ravallion and Datt
2002; Thirtle, 2001) but as shown below the causal relations are
complex in high population density areas.
The contrast in production functions that typify high and low
population density areas are discussed ﬁrst, followed by analysis
of the dichotomy of population groups that dominates high popu-
lation density areas.
Contrasting production functions
Simplistically in low population density areas the distribution
of income is more even than in high population density areas. Typ-ically most families are poor, land operating units are of similar
size and the gini coefﬁcient relatively low. Normal, in areas of
low population density, is for the land to be relatively low produc-
tivity and to have a gently upward sloping production function for
output from labor input.8 That results in little surplus over subsis-
tence and hence little room for some farms to grow with hired labor
and to generate the income for the goods and services from a rural
non-farm sector.9 The much higher cost of physical infrastructure
per family in low population density areas reinforces these tenden-
cies and further inhibits growth.
In areas of high population density the land is by deﬁnition pro-
ductive (it supports a dense population) with a more steeply slop-
ing labor production function and hence a surplus of production
beyond that required to support the labor force. That facilitates
capital accumulation by some, accretion of land, some increasing
their net income by hiring an additional laborer, and the conditions
for a landless or near landless class.10 It is the source of the dichot-
omy between the small commercial farmer and the rural non-farm
family discussed below. Income disparities within such regions are
substantial.11The small commercial farmer
The small commercial farmer class includes, at the lower end of
the scale those with sufﬁcient land to generate a family income
just above the poverty level. They are commercial farmers, selling
sufﬁcient output to pay for the non-food items in their consump-
tion basket. They live in and are part of the local community. They
have consumption patterns that depend heavily on locally pro-
duced non-tradable, labor intensive goods and services. The deﬁni-
tion excludes the absentee landowner with urban oriented
consumption patterns that are import and capital intensive.
Typically across much of high population density Africa with
traditional farming practices and cereal crop production it requires
on the order of one hectare of land to provide sufﬁcient income to
reach the poverty line. If the lower limit is decreased to include
those with landholding large enough to be above the poverty line
with modern high yield crop varieties, the lower limit would drop
to about 0.75 hectares. The upper limit would typically be on the
order of 25 hectares, but rising further in some areas. The paper
by MJ provides detailed data for several countries.
If we apply those rules to Ethiopia the small commercial farmer
would be the two size classes from 0.90 hectares to 25.2 hectares
plus half of the size class from 0.52 to 0.90 (Table 1). That is effec-
tively a top of ﬁve hectares since, due to an earlier land reform,
there are very few farmers with more than ﬁve hectares. The large
commercial farmers are excluded from that calculus. They occupy
two percent of the farmed land.
14 There is a long history in detailing how this works. Johnston and Mellor (1961)
stated increased expenditure by prospering farmers as an important role of
agriculture in economic growth. That concept was spelled out in an overall growth
context in Mellor and Lele (1973), and Mellor (1976, 1992). Hirschman (1958) stated
that the linkages of agricultural growth with other sectors were very weak, but he
focused only on production linkages, whereas the preceding was based largely on
consumption linkages. Johnston and Kilby (1975) however show that the production
linkages are also more powerful than assumed by Hirschman. The relationship has
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land and with somewhat higher yields over 85 percent of output.
There are several million such farm families. Reaching the bulk of
them is not a small task. These farmers determine whether the
government’s targeted agricultural growth rates are reached or
not. They are not poor – perhaps typically twice the average in-
come in their community. They make their living by farming, sell
a minimum of 30 percent of output, and often up to 80 percent,
and are focused on farming to increase their incomes.
Jayne et al. (2010) presents data for average size of farm by farm
size quartile for ﬁve countries – Kenya, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Mozam-
bique, and Zambia. Two of the countries are usually seen as land
scarce, but two are usually seen as land abundant and the third
as in between. The data for Ethiopia (Table 1) are consistent with
the ﬁve country data in Jayne – 81 percent compared to 82 percent
of the land in the top half of the distribution. The average size in
the third quartile is surprisingly similar across the countries. In
the top quartile Kenya and Zambia stand out for larger size proba-
bly reﬂecting a higher proportion of very large holdings.
There has been a concern that some areas in Africa, e.g. parts of
Kenya, have such high population densities that they cannot drive
an increased yield based growth path. The test of that hypothesis
are two. First, are the yields in such areas already at the level of
the advanced Asian countries and the high income countries? If
they are the potential for rapid catch-up growth is lost. Alterna-
tively have efforts to raise yields with poor technology resulted
in irreversible damage to soils, e.g. massive, irreversible erosion
(but not low organic levels that can be corrected). Second, do these
areas represent a substantial portion of the nation’s agricultural
production. For Ethiopia, a high population density nation, the con-
sistent six to seven percent cereals production growth rate shows
the answer to both questions is no. For Kenya the answer to the
second question is clearly no.
The rural non-farm population
The rural non-farm population is comprised of those with insuf-
ﬁcient land to reach the poverty line from farming. They depend on
off-farm income for survival.12 They typically comprise about half of
the rural families. Of course there may be high income families in
trade or professions that do not own land, but they will be few. The
bulk of the rural non-farm population is poor and in high population
density areas essentially all the poor fall in this category. In the data
cited from Jayne et. al. about one-quarter of the rural population in
each of those countries is virtually landless as in Table 1 for Ethiopia.
The rural non-farm population derives its, earned, non-farm in-
come from producing non-tradable labor intensive goods and ser-
vices. What they produce is not salable in large urban centers. That
has two implications.
First, they are dependent on local demand and hence on rising
local incomes if their incomes are to rise. The source of rising local
incomes is agricultural growth from the small commercial farmer.13
Second, since labor is the primary input for what they produce
the supply is as elastic as the labor supply. If the demand increases
the supply increases with little increase in price. Because the de-
mand is income elastic for the non-tradables, growth in incomes
increases the demand and size of this sector more than proportion-
ately to the income increase. As growth gets underway that under-12 In Jayne et al. (2003) it is noted that in Africa there is commonly a direct relation
between size of farm and off farm income. However Ethiopia ﬁts the Asian inverse
relation. Whatever that relation, those with holdings too small to provide the poverty
level of living require off-farm income in order to survive. In a slow growth
agriculture there may be substantial underemployed labor and endemic poverty.
13 The nature of the expenditure patterns of the small commercial farmer are
quantiﬁed by Delgado et al. (1998), Hazell and Roell (1983), Hazell and Ramasamy
(1991), Bell et al. (1982).employed labor force will be gradually taken up leading eventually
to rising wage rates. That is as agricultural income increases the
share of rural non-farm income increases. That seems to be roughly
consistent with the data in table X of Jayne et al. this publication.
Data from Egypt show that the rural non-farm population in-
creases as middle income status is achieved (Gavian et al., 2002,
also Mead and Liedholm, 1998 and Liedholm and Meade 1987).
In a closed economy, a high rate of growth of agricultural produc-
tionwill reduce the price of food, passing the beneﬁt to the poorwho
spend on the order of 80 percent of their income on food (see the
modeling on this by Lele and Mellor, 1981). With open economies
becoming the rule rather than the exception this means of passing
agricultural growth beneﬁts to the poor becomes less important.
In additionusingprices tobeneﬁt thepoordeters productiongrowth
since the incomeof the small commercial farmerwill be reducedand
there employment creating expenditure is reduced as well.
What is the meaning of a large share of the rural population as
rural non-farm (insufﬁcient own farm income for survival) and a
small share of rural non-farm income? It means that those with
inadequate land area for reaching the poverty line are exceedingly
poor, with considerable underemployed labor. Off farm income
may be more from remittances from migration and public sector
employment, including work programs than from expenditures
by the local small commercial farmer. The small commercial farm-
ers may also be quite poor and so provide only modest expenditure
on the rural non-farm sector. As the incomes of the small commer-
cial farmers rise they spend increasing portions on the local non-
tradables. Agricultural income growth will gradually accelerate
growth of income in the rural non-farm sector.
Thuswe have a dichotomyof thosewho produce the bulk of agri-
cultural output and are not poor and the bulk of the poor having
insufﬁcient land toproduceeven theminimumpoverty level of food.
The link that reduces poverty is through the expenditure patters of
the small commercial farmer on the rural non-farm sectors locally
produced, labor intensive, non-tradable goods and services.14
Prior to the green revolution in Asia it was generally assumed
that increasing agricultural production would reduce poverty. As
the green revolution progressed it was soon realized that those
producing the higher incomes were not poor and the poor were
not directly involved in the green revolution. From that came an
anti-green revolution literature that was particularly inﬂuential
as attention shifted to Africa.15 That literature led to an emphasis
on the poor resource areas of low population density where poverty
was more evenly distributed and questioning the efﬁcacy of the
green revolution. That position was further strengthened by the
environmental movement and its common emphasis on low input
agriculture. The result was emphasis on geographic areas with poor
potential for agricultural growth and consequently little reduction in
poverty. What was missed was the lags between agricultural growthbeen modeled by Dorosh and Mellor (2013) in the context of underemployed rural
labor, by Mellor and Ranade (2006) for a neo-classical economy, by Haggblade et al.
(1991), and by Mellor and Gavian (1999) for a middle income country, showing that
as incomes rise the relative importance of the employment effect increases relative to
the GDP effect.
15 Representative of this literature are Grifﬁn (1975), and Harris (1982). They cite
the full range of this point of view. Lipton and Longhurst (1989) provides a nuanced
critique of the Green Revolution in which he is clear that the biological breakthroughs
are essential to relieving poverty, but found much more needed as well. See also
Mellor and Desai (1985)
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Timmer and Ravallion and Datt noted these lags). In time the poverty
reduction occurred.
The government of Ethiopia has emphasized the high potential
assured rainfall areas for their big push on agricultural growth.
With that success has come dramatic reductions in rural poverty
(Ethiopia, 2010).16 In effect that has been the case in the cocoa areas
of Ghana as well.
In the low population density areas with the gently sloping re-
sponse curve to labor input fostering agricultural growthdirectly re-
duces poverty – but in those areas that growth is very difﬁcult and
costly to achieve. The conceptual problem arises with the high pop-
ulationdensity areas. In low income countries the density of poverty
is very high in those areas but the agricultural growth is in the hands
of the non-poor small commercial farmer. Raising their incomedoes
not directly reduce poverty. That is why poverty oriented personnel
in foreign aid agenciesmaypush for emphasis on the lowpopulation
density poor resource areas, with generally poor results.
Food security for the poor
The previous sections show how rising incomes of the small
commercial farmer in high population density areas converts into
increased employment and hence decreased poverty for those be-
low the poverty line. The further conversion into increased food
security follows. The small commercial farmer and urban popula-
tions on average have inelastic demand for cereals, the basic calorie
source, of around 0.3, while the rural non-farmpoor have an elastic-
ity of around 0.8 (Tafere et al., 2010; Bouis, 1999) With the small
commercial farmer spending on the order of half of income incre-
ments on the rural non-farm sector the increased consumption of
basic food staples is large, keeping a major share of increments in
production in the rural areas and consumed by the poor. As for pov-
erty reduction, the road to food security passes through the small
commercial farmer in high population density areas.Accelerating the agricultural growth rate
Binswanger and Pingali (1988), in discussing agricultural
growth in Africa, note two quite different sources of growth: (a) in-
creased traditional inputs; and, (b) application of new technology
and its associated inputs.
Growth through traditional inputs
Ethiopia, a clear example of high population density agriculture,
has maintained a seven-percent growth rate since the mid 1990s.17
The growth rate up to a least 2005 cannot be explained by the growth16 Although many factor affect poverty levels, the major reduction in rural head
count poverty (using the World Bank measures and deﬁnitions from 47.5 percent in
1995/96 to30.4 percent in 2011/12 with acceleration in the more recent ﬁve year
period, is broadly consistent with the cereals growth rate of seven percent and the
similar growth rate for overall agricultural production (Ethiopia, 2012).
17 The source of the basic data is the National Statistical Agency, a highly
professional agency with a well-trained, technocratic, committed head that publishes
its methodology which in turn has been carefully scrutinized. Despite this unusually
professional operation there is a committed set of opponents of the Ethiopian strategy
(Agricultural Development Led Industrialization) that ﬁnds this high growth rate in
agriculture inconsistent with its push for industrialization ﬁrst. The Policy and
Investment Framework (PIF) (Ethiopia, government of, 2010) analyzes these data in
detail, with emphasis on dealing with large year to year ﬂuctuations and supports the
conclusion of a seven percent growth rate. Some estimates place the growth rate
much higher, but they are clearly biased by choice of the period and the placement of
the high and low ﬂuctuations. Stuff (2013) provides a highly sophisticated analysis of
these trends using traditional linear regressions and the Sen method. That analysis
also shows internal consistency of the data. Note that the poverty data for Ethiopia
shows declines fully consistent with the agricultural growth rate (Ethiopia, 2012).in modern inputs (improved seeds and fertilizer). The base and the
growth rateswere initially too small formajor aggregate impact (Ethi-
opia, Government of, 2010). Half the growth is explained by increased
land area. This is surprising given the initially high population densi-
ties and very low incomes. In India, noted for its high rural population
density in the productive areas, in the ﬁrst, second, and third decades
after independence agricultural growth accelerated substantially
with increased land area accounting for half the growth rate (Mellor
et al., 1968) – as in the recent history in Ethiopia. In both cases it is also
likely that increased labor input, perhaps on labor intensive tradi-
tional practices, played a signiﬁcant role. A small role was of course
also played by growth in the modern inputs even from a low base.
Why did the Ethiopian growth rate so greatly exceed any previ-
ousperiod and that in other somewhat similar circumstance in other
African countries?Theonlynew institutional variablewas amassive
expansion in the extension service. In ﬁve years, 63,000 extension
agents received training and were located, six in each Kebela, in
the smallest administrative unit. That put them in walking distance
of most farmers. There are about 400 small commercial farmers in
eachKebela. That is also the size unit seen as optimal for agricultural
ﬁnance branches at that stage of development (Desai and Mellor,
1993). Those extension agents were undoubtedly poorly trained,
but the IFPRI surveys consistently show, corroborated by Focus
Groups in theUSAIDAMDe project, that the small commercial farm-
er has a favorable opinion of them. They were helpful.
The massive size of the extension service provided close contact
with farmers. Presumably they publicized methods of increasing
production without modern inputs, began the process of increasing
use of modern inputs, and energized farmers to increase produc-
tion. The whole thrust of the ADLI strategy and its massive public-
ity perhaps energized farmers. It is notable that the rapid
agricultural growth in Ghana also has to be explained largely with-
out modern technology. In the case of Ghana farmers were ener-
gized to expand the cocoa area substantially thereby increasing
incomes and driving down poverty (Ghana, 2007; Breisinger
et al., 2011). Of course these means of production increase must
eventually run out. Then, modernization must occur.
Application of new technology
In Ethiopia in the early to mid-noughts the impact of the tradi-
tional sources of growthwas declining (Ethiopia, 2010) and somod-
ern technology was to take over. That may also to be the case for
Rwanda and Ghana at present. That creates immense problems of
institutional development. Asian countries demonstrate the need
for public goods and the servicing institutional structures. Gener-
ally the seeds of that growth are present in Africa. Most African
countries have a public sector research system and an extension
system. A specialized agricultural ﬁnance system is generally lack-
ing. The private sector is ready for a wide range of activities.
Research/extension
The point was made earlier that the greater diversity of produc-
tion systems and physical resources requires a substantially larger
research system than for Asian countries to achieve comparable
levels of growth. In contrast the African systems are generally
smaller and certainly have received less foreign assistance in sharp
contrast to the large scale development and close relations with
lots of money between US land grant institutions and those of
Asian countries, and a large effort by the Rockefeller Foundation.1818 Of course, African countries should compensate for poor donor priorities. Ethiopia
put national resources into Teff research, by value the most important cereal, that is
ignored by international support (both in research and in value chain projects) and
has had a major new variety with rapid uptake (Minton et al., 2013). Malaysia did
likewise for oil palm research.
19 Ethiopia has a signiﬁcantly lower price of fertilizer at the farm level than the rest
of East Africa. There is an argument (Rashid et al., 2013) that Ethiopia does subsidize
fertilizer. However that is a convoluted argument. A signiﬁcant part of the ‘‘subsidy’’
is the cost of hugely excessive carryover stocks. It is difﬁcult to argue that the cost of a
failed government policy should be placed on farmers. Similarly, the ‘‘subsidies’’
documented by IFPRI are largely under-payment to the cooperatives for their services
and low interest rates to the cooperatives. Focus Group Studies for the USAID AMDe
project show that private grain traders would like to enter the fertilizer trade once
again and ﬁnd the existing margins fully proﬁtable. These are quite different to the
direct subsidies in other African countries or in India. In any case adding those costs
totaling 14 percent of the price, Ethiopia’s prices to farmers are still lower than in the
other East African countries.
20 Hymer and Resnick (1969) in a paper that predated the analysis of the rural non-
farm sector argued that roads resulted in rapid decline of the rural non-farm sector,
but derived from a view of the rural nonfarm sector as producing goods and services
that were protected from urban competition by poor infrastructure. We now know
that the rural non-farm sector adapts to shifting prices and concentrates on non-
tradable goods and services desired by the rising incomes of the small commercial
farmer. As cited earlier, a middle income country like Egypt has a much larger rural
non-farm sector than lower income Ethiopia.
J.W. Mellor / Food Policy 48 (2014) 66–75 73Of course there has been some history of that in Africa but it ended
far too prematurely and touched only a few countries.
Finance
Finance is essential and a huge problem. In Asian countries
about one-quarter of farm working capital is ﬁnanced by credit
(Desai and Mellor, 1993). Small commercial farmers consistently
report a need for credit even though they are not poor. Commercial
banks do not open the numerous branches required to reach the
small commercial farmer. Micro credit operates on entirely differ-
ent principles for making loans and timing repayment. Micro credit
rarely reaches the small commercial farmer. Thus ﬁnancial systems
with the broad outlines of those in Asia are needed. It is arguable
that enough is now known of the errors of the Asian systems that
the African ones can manage high repayment rates. There are
examples of institutional credit to small commercial farmers that
have close to 100 percent repayment on time (Desai and Mellor,
1993).
Fertilizer
All Asian countries have achieved high levels of fertilizer use.
The countries most explicit in following CAADP place a major
emphasis on increased fertilizer use. They refer to the Africa Fertil-
izer summit, Abuja declaration and its central role of massive in-
crease in fertilizer use as a means towards the ‘‘African Green
Revolution’’ (African Union, 2006). Ethiopia targets a 15 percent
growth rate in fertilizer use (Ethiopia, PIF, 2010) and has increased
use at an eight percent rate (author’s calculations from Agricultural
Inputs Enterprise date). Rwanda started at a very low base of 0.3
kilograms per hectare which means a tiny proportion of farmers
were using fertilizer. By 2011 it had increased the proportion of
farmers using fertilizer to somewhat less than 50 percent (Rwanda,
2012, 2007). That would be a much higher percent of the small
commercial farmers. Desai (2002, 1982) discusses the policy needs
for achieving those high rates of growth. Kelly et al. (2003) raise a
major set of issues relating to the difﬁcult response coefﬁcient
situation.
Despite these high targets for fertilizer use in Ethiopia, Ghana
and Rwanda, there remains in Africa considerable debate about
the soil constraints to high levels of inorganic fertilizer use and
the complementarity with organic sources (e.g. see the complex
discussion in Dreschel et al. (2001) and in Kelly et al. (2003)) There
is no room for debate as to whether large off take of nutrients
accompanying high yields require large inputs of inorganic fertil-
izer. But there is controversy about how or even whether the re-
sponse to that large input will be proﬁtable or even possible
(Dreschel et al., 2001). Having said that Rwanda and Ethiopia are
moving quickly with little evidence of those problems.
Attention was drawn above to the need for relatively greater
emphasis on soil science research in Africa compared to Asia. In
Ethiopia, under use and modest rates of return are easily explained
by poor information transmission about optimal fertilizer practices
(Ethiopia, 2010). It is not clear why that is not true for the rest of
Eastern and Southern Africa. Similarly it is not clear why the
Savannah areas of Africa are so different to similar temperature
and rainfall regimes in central India. It is understandable that the
soil science problems are difﬁcult for the tropical uplands of coast-
al West Africa, but that is why they should be, as in Malaysia, lar-
gely in tropical perennial crops. But the bottom line is relative to its
problems African countries are way under spending on soil science
research, as are the international centers.
Several African countries now subsidize fertilizer at high rates
(Rashid et al., 2013). It is explicit in the Rwandan plan. Ethiopia
has abjured direct subsidy. The World Bank has alternate periods
of pressing for subsidies on fertilizer and periods of being opposed
– then at the same time it may be opposed (in India, where it wasin favor) and favored (in a much of contemporary Africa, where it
was opposed). That sentence catches the confusion! The grand les-
son from Asia is that fertilizer subsidies when use is very low do
not cost the government much and do increase the incentive for
use, perhaps reducing perceived risk and thereby speeding uptake.
By plan that leads to a high level of use at which point the subsidies
become very expensive and in fact drain funds away from roads
and other high return rural investments. Failing a clear exit strat-
egy it is best not to use fertilizer subsidies.
An exit strategy is simple in concept – tie it to high transporta-
tion costs and when those costs come down reduce the subsidy. In
practice it never seems to work that way. Ethiopia does not subsi-
dize fertilizer, and has increased use to nearly 600,000 tons per
year and growing.19
Physical infrastructure
A high proportion of the huge increase in ﬁnance for agricul-
tural growth will be spent on the physical infrastructure of roads,
electriﬁcation and irrigation. The impact of improved roads on
farm level price relationships has already been noted. That is also
a principle means of encouraging growth of the rural non-farm sec-
tor in response to rising local demand.20
Irrigation was covered in the earlier exposition of contrasts be-
tween Asia and Africa. That exposition showed substantial gaps in
knowledge even while the total potential is well documented.
Thus, one is back to the need for far larger research systems than
now exist.
Higher agricultural education
All the critical public institutions and many of the private ones
as well are huge demanders of personnel with higher education in
agriculture. Ethiopia was the beneﬁciary of the early US efforts to
build agricultural Universities. The one the US built is excellent
and has adapted to changing times while the government has rad-
ically expanded additional agricultural universities. The capacity
will be strained when the current effort to build a national agricul-
tural ﬁnance system moves into high gear with huge requirements
for trained agricultural loan ofﬁcers. Nigeria was also a major ben-
eﬁciary of that era of foreign aid. Most other African countries have
not been so fortunate. Of the many errors of American foreign aid
in Africa perhaps far and away the greatest was exiting building
higher education in agriculture.
It is notable that India built an excellent system of agricultural
universities with US assistance – typically India wide institutions
with well trained staff. That growth was associated with growth
in agricultural production. In recent years those institutions along
with research and extension have been deteriorating – increasingly
parochial, local staff, usually of the dominant caste – and as that
Table 2
Ethiopia: hypothetical commodity composition of 6 percent growth rate.
Commodity group Base, percent Growth rate Share of growth
Cereals 32 5 26.7
Livestock 33 7 38.6
Coffee 17 8 22.7
Other 18 4 12.0
Total 100 6 100
Data from National Statistics Agency.
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and Nene, 2011; Desai et al., 2011). The exit of US foreign aid from
this keystone for agricultural growth was far too premature. The
argument here and previously is not that foreign aid has com-
pletely abdicated from these ﬁelds, but that in Africa where the
need is far greater far less is done than in earlier decades in Asia.
Commodity priorities
It was noted earlier that greater diversity in African agriculture
requires greater expenditure on a more commodity speciﬁc set of
institutions. Table 2 presents for Ethiopia calculations of hypothet-
ical sector-wise distribution of growth rates. Achieving even the
CAADP target of a six percent growth rate requires substantial in-
crease in growth rates in each sector. Because of the high, now
unrealized, potential for growth in the export perennial (coffee)
its share of incremental output is almost as large as cereals. But
note also that it is still only one-quarter of the incremental output.
To emphasize coffee does not call for neglect of cereals. Most other
African countries demonstrate a similar diversity.
Conclusion
Africa must increasingly obtain its agricultural growth from in-
creased value of output per hectare. The roughly half of rural fam-
ilies in the high population density areas that are small commercial
farmers dominate agricultural production growth. As in Asia that
growth will come from new crop varieties that greatly increase
output per hectare. More output of course requires more input,
the largest component of which will be plant nutrients – fertilizer.
Increased access to water will become more important.
To achieve growth on national scales requires a high density of
all-weather rural roads and rural electriﬁcation. These are also
essential to education and health of the rural populations that will
for several decades continue to grow in absolute size even in the
face of rapid urbanization.
Large scale development of public institutions of research,
extension, and at least initially, ﬁnance, is required along with
the institutions of higher learning required for stafﬁng these insti-
tutions and the rapidly growing private sector servicing small com-
mercial farmers.
The paucity of all these investments and institutional structures
requires a full commitment to agricultural growth, priority to the
high potential geographic areas and to the small commercial farm-
er. Because of the greater diversity of agriculture in Africa com-
pared to Asia these investments must be much larger relative to
the size of agriculture than was the case in Asia.
Accelerated growth of production by the small commercial
farmer will provide large scale expenditure on the employment
intensive, non-tradable rural non-farm sector providing the large
declines in poverty associated with rapid growth of small-holder
agriculture. Food security for the poor will follow directly from
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